The early development of large multidivisional corporations in Latin America required much more than capable managers, new technologies, and large markets. Behind such corporations was a market for capital in which entrepreneurs had to attract investors to buy either debt or equity. This paper examines the investor protections included in corporate bylaws that enabled corporations in Brazil to attract investors in large numbers, thus generating a relatively low concentration of ownership and control in large firms before 1910. Archival evidence such as company statutes and shareholder lists document that in many Brazilian corporations voting rights provisions, in particular, maximum vote provisions and graduated voting scales (that provided for less than proportional votes as shareholdings increase), balanced the relative voting power of small and large investors. In companies with such provisions the concentration of ownership and control is shown to have been significantly lower than in the average company. Overall, from the sample of Brazilian companies studied it seems like the concentration of control was significantly lower before 1910 than what it is today.
Introduction
The early development of large multidivisional corporations in Latin America required much more than capable managers, new technologies, and large markets.
Behind such corporations was a market for capital in which entrepreneurs had to attract investors to buy either debt or equity. This paper examines the investor protections included in corporate bylaws that enabled corporations in Brazil to attract investors in large numbers, thus generating a relatively low concentration of ownership and control in large firms before 1910.
The main argument of the paper is that the development of equity markets at the turn of the twentieth century in Brazil required companies and their founders to be willing to offer protections to outside shareholders, especially small investors, in order to encourage them to buy equity. When these protections were included, they reduced agency costs and guaranteed small investors they would have certain protections against the possible abuses of large investors or other insiders. These shareholder protections are an important consideration because, according to the theory of the firm as stated by, for example, Jensen and Meckling, outside investors risk extraction or expropriation of value by a company's managers and insiders. 1 How to mitigate that risk through contract provisions that afford outside investors some degree of security has for several decades been a topic of debate among academics and practitioners interested in corporate finance and corporate governance.
According to Jonathan B. Baskin and Paul J. Miranti, Jr., it was not until companies resolved this agency problem through contractual arrangements that the basic problem of information asymmetry between insiders and investors that early corporations were able to induce outside investors to buy securities on a large scale.
According to these authors, "differences in goals and access to knowledge frequently placed investors at a disadvantage in dealing with their corporate agents. " They argue that "investor wealth, for example, could be threatened either by corporate agents' opportunism or, in the extreme case of moral hazard, by dishonesty, " adding that "such risks could be diminished by more effective contracting. " They saw the solution not in national legislation, but in liens secured against enterprise assets, in the case of bonds, or incentive compatible contracts that accommodate outside investors' monitoring of agents through the creation of boards of directors or, ultimately, improvements in financial reporting. 2 Yet lately the focus of that debate has shifted away from firms and contracts to national differences in the extent to which national company laws protect shareholders.
A large body of scholarly work known as the law and finance literature maintains that companies can enact bylaws that mitigate abuses by managers and other insiders, but that including such protections results, especially in developing countries, in contracts that are exceedingly complex and difficult to enforce (because judges are not trained to interpret and enforce such contracts). For this reason, according to this literature, what matters most for equity market development are investor protections written into national company and securities laws that, by imposing a degree of standardization upon them, make corporate charters easier to enforce, and, indeed, research has found equity markets to be more developed in countries that have legislated more shareholder protections. 3 In fact, it turns out that countries that follow the common law legal tradition currently provide stronger protections for investors than countries that follow any of the three civil law legal families (French, German, and Scandinavian) . 4 Among the implications of these findings are (1) that investor protections in national laws 2 Jonathan B. Baskin and Paul J. Miranti, Jr., A History of Corporate Finance, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, especially p. 6. See also Jonathan B. Baskin, "The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 1600-1914: Overcoming Asymmetric Information," The Business History Review 62-2 (Summer, 1988), pp. 199-237 . The latter paper lays out the basis of the main idea behind Baskin's book with Miranti.
3 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "Legal Determinants of External Finance," and " Law and Finance." 4 See, for instance, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "Law and Finance," Tables 2 and 4. matter for the development of capital markets, and (2) that the legal tradition a country follows has a bearing on the kind of investor protections it can provide and exerts a long-term effect on the development of equity markets in the country.
Using historical evidence on shareholder rights included in corporate charters and ownership concentration this paper questions the both of these ideas. In particular, the idea that differences in legal systems really impose clear differences in investor protections and financial development in the long run. This deterministic argument should make us feel rather uncomfortable when looking at history over long periods of time given that it implies strong-path dependence and provides little room for changing circumstances over time. What if things were different a hundred years ago? This is why this paper suggests that more historical research is needed to determine to what degree the national institutional environment is truly determined by legal origin and to what extent it constrains corporations from devicing their own contracts to solve the main principal agent problem. The company-level evidence from Brazil shows that both legal tradition and the national regulatory regime are not necessarily binding. On the contrary, companies and their shareholders can overcome adverse institutional environments by devising contracts that include protections for small shareholders, as long as there is a basic regulatory framework that guarantees some of those protections will be enforced by the judicial system. Evidence against the idea that legal traditions adopted hundreds or decades ago determines a natural ordering of countries in terms of legal protection for investors and the development of equity markets is now growing rapidly. We know, for example, from Rajan and Zingales, that German and French civil law countries had larger equity markets than their common law counterparts circa 1913. 5 legislation. 9 Brazilian legislation helped small investors monitor firms' activities by mandating regular disclosure of financial accounts, including full disclosure of directors' compensation, and providing strict penalties for fraud during initial public offerings (IPOs) of stocks and bonds.
The case of Brazil is particularly interesting because, in Latin America before World War I, it boasted the second largest equity market and largest number of traded companies (even when normalized by size of country). 10 This is puzzling given that the country supposedly has one of the worst possible institutional inheritances of the Americas. A Portuguese colony, Brazil became a catholic country that embraced the French civil law tradition, two institutional features that have been linked to small financial markets and weak investor protections. 11 High mortality among Portuguese settlers and a high proportion of natives (later slaves) to settlers have also been linked to 9 Colleen Dunlavy argues that mandatory maximum vote provisions and graduated voting scales included in state company laws in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century created a more democratic (her word is plutocratic) voting system that constrained the proportion of votes that could be controlled by any large shareholder during shareholder meetings. See Colleen Dunlavy, "From Citizens to Plutocrats: 19 th -Century Shareholder Voting Rights and Theories of the Corporation," and "Corporate Governance in Late 19 th -Century Europe and the U.S.: The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights."
10 Arguably Cuba had the largest equity market in Latin America circa 1913, yet the number of corporations traded was very small. Also, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales estimate that in 1913 the stock market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio for Brazil was 25%, and for both Argentina and Chile, 17%. The author estimates that in that year Rio de Janeiro had 335 listed corporations, São Paulo 145 (excluding cross-listings), giving for the number of traded companies per million people 20.8 (assuming a population of about 23 million). Rajan and Zingales' estimates of that ratio for that year were for Argentina 15. Tables 3 and 5 , and Aldo Musacchio, "Experiments in Financial Democracy: Corporate Governance and Financial Development in Brazil, 1882 -1950 ," unpublished book manuscript, Harvard Business School, December 2007 11 On the relationship between religion and financial development, see René M. Stulz and Rohan Williamson, "Culture, Openness, and Finance," Journal of Financial Economics 70 (2003) : 313-349; for the relationship between legal origin, investor protections, and financial development, see Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance 52-3 (1997 ): 1131 -1150 , and "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy 106-6 (1998 ): 1113 -1155 weak rule of law. 12 In marked contrast to the period examined here, Brazil today does have weak rule of law, weak investor protections, and high ownership concentration.
A Quick Look at the Recent Literature on Shareholder Protections
An influential series of papers known as the law and finance literature argues that minority shareholders are afforded protection by a basic set of principles, or rights, embodied in corporate laws with which companies are obliged to comply. Smaller investors are presumed to be encouraged by these protections to participate in the ownership of corporations, thereby deepening equity markets. 13 According to La Porta et al., the basic set of small investor protections incorporated in national company laws should include voting rights for all shareholders (specifically, one-share, one-vote provisions) and six other six protections. They create an index of shareholder protections based on how many of these six protections were included in a nation's company laws. The provisions are (1) proxy voting, whereby shareholders absent from shareholder meetings are permitted to vote, (2) that shares not have to be deposited before shareholder meetings (some companies required this to prevent shareholders from selling their equity for several days after a meeting), (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation whereby minority shareholders can elect board members, (4) the right of minority shareholders to challenge directors and assembly decisions in court, or the option to sell their holdings and end their participation in the firm in the event of disagreement with a managerial or assembly decision, (5) company from being diluted in the event the assembly decides to expand total equity, and (6) that the percentage of capital needed to call an extraordinary meeting be less than or equal to 10%. 14 Coding countries according to how many of these protections were accorded by national laws in 1995, the authors found the countries with greater numbers of protections to have larger equity markets (and higher numbers of corporations traded) and the extent of these protections to be highly correlated with the legal tradition a country follows, leading them to conclude that "because legal origins are highly correlated with the content of the law, and because legal families originated before financial markets had developed, it is unlikely that laws were written primarily in response to market pressure. " 15 Their assertion is thus that a country's level of investor protections is determined by the legal tradition it follows.
But historical evidence presented by recent research suggests that investor protections were not necessary for the development of equity markets. Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi found that Great Britain's stock markets evolved rapidly after 1890 despite the lack of shareholder protections in national laws. Franks, Mayer, and Hannes Wagner reach similar conclusions in their work on Germany, which developed a significant equity market after 1930 without the benefit of shareholder protections in its national laws. In the case of Germany, banks substituted for explicit legal protections by intermediating between investors and companies and thereby providing the protection and trust needed to quell investors' fear of fraud by company directors and founders. 16 14 The methodology to estimate the index of shareholder rights comes mostly from Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "Law and Finance," Tables 1 and  2. 15 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopes-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "Legal Determinants of External Finance," p. Finally, Eric Hilt's research on early New York corporations reveals that corporate bylaws often provided important protections to small investors in the form of voting provisions that limited the power of large shareholders. Dunlavy also argues that voting rights matter and that company laws in certain U.S. states protected shareholders more when they included mandatory graduated voting scales (i.e., fewer votes per share as shareholdings increase). Yet those protections disappeared after the 1880s as many of the most industrialized US states began to mandate one-share, onevote provisions. In fact, even if the U.S. is the stereotypical case of a country with strong shareholder protections today, and with some relatively good practices in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, Naomi Lamoreaux and Jean Laurent Rosenthal find protections for minority shareholders to have been relatively weak during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States, using an extensive set of court cases to show that directors and large shareholders "engaged in a variety of … actions from which they benefited at the expense of their associates. " 17 Table 1 protections were binding on all corporations in Brazil until 1940. From 1882 until 1891, all corporations were required to allow proxy voting and were not permitted to require shareholders to deposit their shares before assemblies. When the latter right was withdrawn in 1891, shareholders in possession of bearer shares were required to deposit them with the company and register their names in order to vote in shareholder meetings. This provision was not properly against shareholders, but rather a way to maintain a registry of who was to vote in shareholder assemblies. 
Investor Protections in Brazil

Figure 1 Shareholder Rights and Average Stock Market Capitalization to GDP, 1890-2003
Source: Table 1 Even with few shareholder protections on paper, Brazil enjoyed its first peak in stock market activity between the late 1880s and 1915. In fact, there seems to be a tenuous relation between shareholder protections in national laws and stock market development in that, by the time additional protections for minority shareholders were written into law in 1940, stock markets were already in decline. 19 Moreover, if the literature that relates equity market size to shareholder rights on paper holds, Brazil's equity markets should have prospered between 1940 and the 1990s, when investor protections were strong (in Table 1 ), and jumped significantly in size after 2001 (after laws provided even more protections). But this is clearly not the evolution observed. As can be seen in Figure A review of past company bylaws in Brazil that reveals significant variation in the voting schemes used is examined below.
Which National Laws Matter for the Protection of Shareholders?
If the legal protections of Of course, financial disclosure in Brazil was far from perfect. As in England, "depreciation accounting rules were not well developed" and "directors could create secret reserves by understating profits in good years, raiding them -without disclosing this -in bad. " 26 Nor did having had mandatory disclosure and limited liability since 1882 prevent a major crisis of investor confidence. A rapid increase in the money supply after 1888, when the rules constraining banks from issuing bearer notes were relaxed, intensified in November 1889 when a republican movement took over the government and the new minister of finance, Rui Barbosa, increased the issue of bank notes by creating (on top of the banks authorized to issue notes) a national system of reserve banks with the right to issue notes with the objective of expanding the money supply. The resulting rapid increase in the money supply was accompanied by an increase in bank loans that fueled a boom in stock market activity.
This speculative fever, called the encilhamento, had perverse effects on the wealth of some shareholders of ghost companies and companies that went bust in 1891.
Investor confidence in joint stock corporations would have been shaken for a long period of time had it not been for the legislative reaction to the crisis. The Ministry of Justice reacted by asking Dídimo Agapito Veiga Júnior, an expert in company law, to draft a new law that would prevent further corporate fraud. His approach to company law was consistent with the liberal tradition that permeated the ideology of the new republican government. He believed that "the interested parties [i.e., the shareholders] are the ones concerned about protecting their rights through clear and protective With Brazil's Company Law mandating private disclosure and requiring that founders and promoters of new corporations publish and publicize their statutes including shareholder lists, the bylaws that regulated corporate governance, and detailed information about executive compensation, voting rights, and share ownership, investors were afforded after 1891 the means to monitor managers and insiders and evaluate prospective investments. A small investor considering buying shares in a company could determine, for example, how powerful large shareholders were (by examining the size of their shareholdings and voting power) and know at the outset who the directors were, the number of shares and votes they controlled, and their fixed and performance-based compensation.
Other protections for shareholders were left to a corporation's founders and shareholders to decide, and often included in the statutes that were drafted such important shareholder protections as the right of minorities opposed to a merger to walk away from the corporation with payment equivalent to the higher of their share of the total net worth of the corporation or share of the value of the company according to the merger offer, the exclusion of family members from serving on the managing and overseeing boards of directors simultaneously (a provision seldom respected), and the requirement that managers not engage in business deals with family members or related firms without first informing the corporation. 29 Coincidentally, the disclosure requirements included in Brazilian law after 1891 have recently been linked to the development of equity markets around the world.
Recent revisions to the rights that should matter for financial development by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer include, among other indicators, what they call an "index of disclosure requirements" that is highly correlated with different measures of stock market size. Although calculation of this index is not as straightforward as for the shareholder rights presented in Table 1 , the index is higher if a prospectus (1) is required by law to be published before the sale of shares, (2) discloses the compensation of directors and key officers, (3) discloses the names and ownership stakes of shareholders who control, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the voting shares, (4) discloses the share ownership of directors and key officers, (5) discloses for the issuing company contracts outside of the ordinary course of business, and (6) discloses transactions between the issuing company and its directors, officers, or large shareholders. The index is estimated by averaging how many of these protections are present. 30 Brazil after 1891 had at least the first four provisions, which would yield an estimated index of 0.66 (or 4/6).
The level of mandatory disclosure of information was higher in Brazil than in Germany or England at least until 1929. Franks, Mayer, and Rossi estimate that England required only that a prospectus be issued, and Franks, Mayer, and Wagner that Germany had none of the index's disclosure requirements. 31 To gauge the significance of this relative to contemporary standards, if Brazil today had these same provisions (and associated index of 0.66), it would be one of the three French civil law countries with the strongest disclosure requirements, which would be similar to those of Ireland, Israel, and New Zealand among common law countries. 32 In sum, Brazilian company law preferred to leave to investors the regulation of financial markets and included provisions to help them gather the necessary information to do this job. Beyond the information mandated to be disclosed, actual protections that induced shareholders to purchase equity mostly took the form of bylaws included in corporate statutes, some of which are explored below.
Investor Protections in Company Bylaws
Of the provisions to protect small shareholders that might have induced investment in many of Brazil's traded corporations, two in particular, government guarantees and voting provisions, are examined in this section. Table I. 31 See Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, "Ownership: Evolution and Regulation," , 1995, pp. 383-414. 35 Some of the earliest railroad companies were not particularly successful, a number failing altogether. The railroad Dom Pedro II, for example, established to transport coffee from the Paraiba Valley to the port of Rio de Janeiro, had to be bailed out in 1865 when it ran out of funds to complete construction. See Flávio A. M. Saes, A Grande Empresa de Serviços Públicos na Economia Cafeeira, São Paulo: HUCITEC, 1986, pp. 37-38. surplus was required to be divided between the company and the government. 36 These subsidies proved to be a powerful incentive, facilitating rapid development of railway companies in Brazil.
Because the subsidies also provided incentives for excessive risk taking on the part of managers and founders, the government regulated and monitored some of these companies rigorously, requiring, for example, earlier than for the rest of Brazilian corporations, the publication of complete financial information including profit and loss statements. As most of the companies awarded these subsidies operated government concessions for railway lines, utilities, ports, or waterworks, in the event the contract was violated in any way or the company driven into insolvency, the concession would revert to the government. 37 Voting rights. More important than the many disclosure requirements were the provisions that divided power among shareholders. Bylaws that established the voting rights of shareholders were key to encouraging the participation of small investors in equity ownership. There are only a few scenarios in which small investors would want to participate in the ownership of a corporation in which voting power is controlled by a large shareholder. 38 Most investors preferring that the balance of power not be tilted towards insiders, directors, or large shareholders, a significant number of Brazilian corporations (mostly before 1910) used voting rights to distribute power more evenly 36 On the history of the expansion of railroads and subsidy policies, see William R. Summerhill III, Order Against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1851-1913 38 This might be the case when two rival groups with large shareholdings monitor one another or when a large shareholder with a good reputation monitors the actions of directors or founders. In both cases, small shareholders would buy equity as a way to free ride on the monitoring efforts of the large shareholders. show the cost of a single share (with face value of 200 mil reis) to have equaled the entire annual salary of a cook, carpenter, or messenger, and other, relatively unskilled, workers earned less per year than the face value of one share (normally either 100 or 200 mil reis), most jobs at the time paying an average wage of between 100 and 200 mil reis per year. 40 Thus, the reference to "democratic" practices should not be construed to extend beyond the landowners, professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, bankers, dentists, and engineers), widows, urban landlords, and other citizens with relatively high incomes or sizable inheritances who could buy corporate stocks.
The importance of voting provisions that limited the power of large shareholders can be gauged from the bottom row of Table 2 , which shows that more than a quarter of the companies in the 1909 sample limited the maximum number of votes a single shareholder could cast during a given meeting. On average, 26% of companies capped the maximum number of votes, more than 38% in industries such as utilities and shipping. Although no companies in services and mining and some other industries were observed to use this voting scheme, the sample size is small for those sectors.
Capping the maximum number of votes protected smaller shareholders by (1) limiting the power large shareholders could exert during shareholder meetings, and (2) encouraging the formation of large voting blocks that included smaller shareholders as a way to reach consensus on important assembly resolutions including the election of directors. The decision-making process was thereby rendered more democratic, with smaller investors encouraged either to participate more actively in shareholder assemblies or at least decide which voting blocks to join. Table 3 shows the differences discussed above to be statistically significant.
The Antarctica Brewery, which was dominated by a few families of German immigrants with large shareholdings, employed voting caps. In fact, the concentration of share ownership was quite large (the top three shareholders controlled 62% of the equity). But owing to the maximum votes per shareholder restriction (of 40 votes), these 43 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a convenient measure of concentration because its inverse (i.e., 1/x) gives the equivalent number of shareholders needed to have a specific level of concentration. families had to broker deals to share power (in 1913, for example, the top three shareholders controlled 58% of total equity but only 12% of the votes). As an additional check on possible abuses by a single family, the company bylaws included a provision that prohibited two members of the same family from serving on the board simultaneously. 44 Voting caps and graduated voting rights together reduced concentration of control significantly in companies such as E.F. Paulista and E.F. Mogyana. In the 1890s, the largest three shareholders of the Paulista and Mogyana owned 10% and 13% of the total shares, but in most shareholder meetings controlled only 7% and 10% of the votes, respectively. The cap on the maximum number of votes was increased as the capital of these companies expanded, and disappeared altogether in some companies as share issues accelerated during the boom years of stock market activity . For E. Note: T-statistics marked as follows: + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: All data from the Appendix.
Government-guaranteed dividends might also be expected to have affected concentration of ownership. About one-fifth of the companies in the sample enjoyed this investor protection and, as can be seen in Table 4 , companies with government guarantees seem to have had lower concentration of ownership (shares), and especially of control rights (votes). On average, government guarantees reduced the percentage of shares and votes controlled by the three largest shareholders by almost 20% (these differences are statistically significant at 5% and 10%, respectively). Yet, there are no significant differences in the HHI of companies with government guarantees. T-statistics marked as follows: + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: All data from the Appendix. Table 5 reports significantly lower concentration of ownership and control in companies with graduated voting schemes than in the other companies in the sample.
To give an idea of the differences between the average Brazilian company and those with graduated voting scales, the HHI is only 0.08 for the latter, with the three largest shareholders controlling, on average, 24% of the votes and 30% of the shares, whereas in companies without these voting schemes the largest three shareholders controlled 55% of the shares and 53% of the votes and had an HHI of 0.22. Concentration of ownership and control was thus more than twice in most companies what it was in companies with graduated voting scales.
Analyzing the effects of these three governance provisions on ownership concentration is difficult because they overlap significantly. Brazil, the Indústrias Reunidas Fábricas Matarazzo, opening up the capital to subscription by friends and other family members. The statutes were, by design, somewhat democratic, incorporating, in 1911, for example, the ten shares for one vote and maximum of 50 votes rule. This voting scheme restricted the top three, five, and ten shareholders, who controlled most of the equity, to 10%, 17%, and 34% of total votes, respectively. But the scheme lasted only a few years. By the 1920s, the Matarazzo family had purchased back most of the equity held by non-family members and changed the voting rights, first, pulverizing share ownership by issuing thousands of smalldenomination shares (10$ mil reis), then altering the statutes to restrict the right to vote to only those with holdings of 1:000$ (a thousand mil-reis). In 1934, only four or five shareholders held enough shares to vote. From that time on, the family purchased most shares and held them tightly. 52 The Matarazzo family controlled a variety of businesses including the Banco Italiano del Brasile, the complete shareholder lists of which helps to illuminate its approach to corporate governance (see Panel B of Table 6 
Conclusion
This paper shows that many large Brazilian corporations at the turn of the twentieth century induced small investors to buy equity by choosing bylaws that distributed power in a more democratic way among shareholders. In fact, the evidence shows that maximum vote provisions (and to a lesser degree graduated voting scales)
were correlated with lower concentration of ownership and voting power.
These results are surprising for at least three reasons. First, the paper shows that the shareholder protections in national laws that seem to have mattered most were those that facilitated the private monitoring of corporate activities by requiring corporations to publish important financial information. Second, the paper shows that it is possible for companies to break with the institutional environment in which they operate. Corporations can attract small investors by adopting, in the absence of national laws that include provisions to protect small investors, democratic bylaws that are better than the protections included in national company laws.. Finally, the evidence presented here suggests that it is unlikely that the institutions relevant to the expansion of equity markets and development of large multidivisional corporations were determined hundreds of years ago, either at the time of colonization or when countries adopted their current legal systems. The considerable variation over time at the country level, and even at the company level, needs to be studied in more detail before we can make grand statements about the persistency of institutions, especially of legal traditions. 
